Germany’s friendship with Germany began long before Fischer, and will outlive the Georgian Dream government now bent on rejecting it.

I spoke with TVP World today about Meloni’s Yerevan-Baku shuttle. Two airports, one strategy — and a clearer Europe coming into view.On 4 May, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni attended the 8th European Political Community summit in Yerevan, then flew directly to Baku to meet President Ilham Aliyev. Same roses at both airports. The sequencing was deliberate.The Caucasus is no longer Europe’s periphery. It is becoming part of its core.That was the through-line of our conversation:→ Italy depends on Azerbaijan for 17% of its oil and 16% of its gas. That makes Baku the indispensable partner on Europe’s southern flank — and explains why a Yerevan visit could not stand alone.→ The 8th EPC summit produced real substance: the EU–Armenia Connectivity Partnership, the new EUPM Armenia civilian mission, the UK–Armenia strategic partnership, and Canada’s debut on the European stage. Aliyev, meanwhile, was present but absent.→ The Black Sea Submarine Cable Project — 1,195 km of HVDC interconnection from Anaklia to Constanța, $3 billion in total cost with $2 billion in EU financing, designed and built by Italian industry — is no longer a line on a map. It is becoming the spine of a new energy geography.From the Southern Gas Corridor to the Black Sea cable, the Caucasus is being wired directly into Europe’s energy and connectivity core. Meloni’s shuttle was not a detour. It was a declaration.

Discussed the lessons Georgia’s opposition can draw from Hungary’s political shift following Péter Magyar’s victory over Viktor Orbán. Key points: Magyar succeeded by uniting the opposition around himself rather than through his Fidesz affiliation — his political capital came from rebellion, not party association. While direct comparisons between Hungary and Georgia are fraught (different electoral systems, EU membership as a constraining mechanism, differing media landscapes and Russian propaganda exposure), there are baseline takeaways: opposition consolidation matters, effective use of social media (TikTok, Facebook, YouTube) can compensate for lack of traditional media access, and any new opposition force in Georgia needs to connect with the fears and concerns of Georgian Dream’s own electorate — not necessarily by producing a defector from GD, but by speaking to the anxieties within that voter base.

My analysis of Georgian Dream’s stance on Taiwan was cited in the Global Taiwan Brief, published by the Global Taiwan Institute (Washington, D.C.). The April 2026 piece by journalist James Baron examines why Georgia became the only country in the world to bar Taiwanese nationals from entry — and the geopolitical logic behind it. I spoke to the author in London in October 2025, offering context on how Georgian Dream instrumentalises the Taiwan question to placate Beijing while hedging against Russian pressure.

My appearance on TV Pirveli focused on the conspiracy theories and disinformation narratives that have come to define Georgian Dream’s foreign policy discourse. I argued that the ruling party has systematically cultivated a worldview in which Georgia is the target of coordinated Western interference — a framing that justifies its drift toward Moscow and Beijing while delegitimising domestic opposition and civil society.

I contrasted this with the more pragmatic trajectories of Armenia and Azerbaijan, both navigating post-Russian influence with clearer strategic logic. The South Caucasus remains a critical transit corridor, and Georgia’s self-imposed diplomatic paralysis carries real costs. A return to evidence-based, pro-European foreign policy is not optional — it is urgent.

My analysis of Georgian Dream’s foreign policy rhetoric was cited extensively in the Kyiv Post, one of Ukraine’s leading English-language publications. The February 2026 piece by journalist James Lewis examines how Georgia’s ruling party uses rhetorical sleight of hand — what I describe as “immense gaslighting” and “mirroring” — to conceal its drift toward Russia while maintaining the pretense of European integration. I spoke to the author about Ivanishvili’s alignment with Moscow, Georgian Dream’s propaganda tactics, and why their balancing act is failing on every front.

I spoke at an international conference in Chișinău organised by the Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR), bringing together civil society representatives from Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria to discuss tactics for countering Russian malign influence. Drawing on Georgia’s long-term exposure to hybrid threats, I described a propaganda “unholy trinity” operating in the country — messaging from Moscow, local pro-Kremlin actors, and imported far-right narratives — and argued that democracies must present a compelling, positive vision of the future, as “we shall never be able to outfear Russia.” The conference, opened by the British Ambassador to Moldova, examined how Moldova’s civic-media collaboration during the 2025 elections offers a model for the wider region.